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We consider four institutions to facilitate access to patent, three types of clear-
ing houses and patent pools, and identify characteristics that determine their suc-
cess. We ﬁrst regroup the four into “exchanges” and “collective rights organiza-
tions” (CRO). Network effect of exchanges means that a critical mass of members
must be guaranteed for success. Among the two CROs, royalty collection clearing
houses and patent pools, the striking difference is their stability. Royalty clearing
houses impose negative externality on non-members which makes it easy to attract
new members and makes them very stable. On the contrary, patent pools generate
positive externality to non-members which makes them unstable.
∗Prepared for Workshop “Gene patents and clearing models”, June 8-10 2006, Centre for Intellectual
Property Rights, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.
†Department of Economics, University of Auckland, r.aoki@auckland.ac.nz.
11 Introduction
Several institutions have been identiﬁed as possible mechanisms for facilitating access
to genetic patents: research exemptions, compulsory licensing, open source collectives,
patent pools and clearing houses (Van Overwalle et al.,2005). There are three types of
clearing houses: information exchange, technology exchange, open source collectives
and royalty collection.
In this paper we examine the clearing houses and patent pools. We will ﬁrst divide
the 4 institutions into 2 groups. The ﬁrst two clearing houses are purely for exchange.
The purpose of an information exchange is for owners (and potential providers) to
disseminate and the potential users to access information about the technology. Tech-
nology exchange clearing house goes one step further in that technology is sold or
licensed. The property owners (potential provider) and users interact directly and prop-
erty owners retain ownership.
Theothertwoinstitutions, royaltycollectingclearinghousesororganizations(RCO)
and patent pools as “collective rights organizations” (CRO, Merges, 1992). We ar-
gue later that we can include open-source collectives in this group. They are so called
“two-sided markets” (Tirole and Rochet, 2006), since CROs interact with the prop-
erty owners (provider) and users separately. The providers and users do not interact
directly (although in case of patent pools, this is a possibility). The organization has
some control over the property, including commitment not to exercise exclusivity in
case of open-source collectives.
2 Exchanges
Beneﬁt of information and technology exchanges comes from reduction of transaction
costs, primarily search costs. There is additional reduction of contracting costs if the
exchange offers some sort of standard licensing agreements that provider and user can
1adhere to.
Exchanges are based on the so-called “network effect” that arises from the ex-
changes ability to reduce search costs. The particulars of the network effect must be
taken into account in order to initiate an exchange successfully.
Network Effect
An institution has a network effect when beneﬁt to the members depends on the number
of members. The following is a very simple model that capture this effect. There are
continuum of agents, represented by interval [0,1]. Agents are indexed by x ∈ [0,1].
An agent x gets beneﬁt of 1−x per interaction with another agent, such as learning
about the others’ technology. All agents beneﬁt but the size of the beneﬁt depends on
the agent. Thus if x > y, then agent y gets higher beneﬁt per interaction than agent
x. Suppose n is the number (in this case proportion of agents to be precise) that are





n(1 − x) − p if he is a member
0 otherwise
,
where p is the price of joining the exchange. The marginal agent, ˆ x, is indifferent
between joining and not joining the exchange,
U ˆ x = n(1 − ˆ x) − p = 0.
This also means all the agents in interval [0, ˆ x] are in the exchange since all agents
y < ˆ x have higher surplus. Noting that n = ˆ x, we have,
ˆ x(1 − ˆ x) = p.
2This is the demand function for membership. However the relationship between de-
mand (to be member) and price is not monotonic. Higher price can increase demand
for some region. Furthermore, at any price, p, there are two levels of membership that
are equilibria, one with low membership, xL(p) and the other high, xH(p).
Itispossibleforanexchangetobeinequilibriumwithveryfewmembers. However
this is not a stable equilibrium. Any deviation of membership above xL(p) will move
the market to the other equilibrium, xH(0). Since non-members have no surplus, it is
better to be in equilibrium with larger membership.
Model of an Exchange
The interesting question with exchanges is how they can be successfully formed. To
answer this question we differentiate between providers of information or technology
and the users. Only the number of providers matter for a user while only the number
of users matter for a provider. Except for the indirect effect of making the exchange
attractive to the users, there is no gain to aS provider from having more providers. It
would just increase competition.
Suppose both providers and users are separately distributed over interval [0,1]. The
surplus of a provider (xP) and a user (xS) are given below. The variables nP and nU












nP(1 − xU) − cU if member of exchange
0 otherwise
Again, as in the case of simple network, if the marginal agent is xP, then nP = xP.
3From the indifference conditions we obtain the following two demand for member-
ships, one for users and the other for providers,
xU(1 − xP) = cP, xP(1 − xU) = cU.
We can rewrite the ﬁrst equation as,




This is a provider’s demand function for membership: how many providers join the
exchange given cost is cP and there are xU users in the exchange. There will be more
providers joining when cost is low and there are more users.
Equilibrium memberships, xP(cP,cU) and xU(cP,cU), satisfy the two demand
functions at once. Curves DP and DU in Figure 2 are the graphs of the two functions.
There are two intersections, meaning there are two levels of equilibrium membership:
one when membership from both sides is high and one when membership is low. Be-
cause of the network effect, exchange can be in equilibrium at a very small scale.
If the costs are too high, there may be no intersection between the two curves, such
as DP and D0
U, i.e., no one will join the exchange. In a case like this, one can subsidize
the users to make them join. This will also induce providers to join.
It is not necessary to lower the cost (price) for both sides. In the graph D0
U is user
demand when cU = .3. One only needs to lower cU from .3 to .1 (curve DU) in order to
have an equilibrium. It is also possible to reduce providers’ cost and shift DP instead.
A typical example of this is how community newspapers are ﬁnanced. Some allowing
free classiﬁed advertisement so people will buy the newspaper while some charge for
advertisement and distribute the paper for free.
4Formation and Stability
Because of the network effect, some form of coordination is necessary to form an
exchange. It is necessary to get a critical mass, at least as large as xL(p). If price is
lowered slightly to p0 < p, the exchange will converge to a higher equilibrium, xH(p0).
This equilibrium is stable, meaning the economy will not move away even if there is
a small perturbation of prices. In this sense, once attained, institutions with network
effect is very stable.
We observed with the simple model that in order to accumulate critical mass, one
does not have to lower price (or cost) to everyone. It is sufﬁcient to make it attractive to
one side, providers or users. Call to join can concentrate on one side of the exchange.
If institutions such as governments and international organizations are to subsidize for-
mation, itmaybemorecosteffectivetoconcentrateononeside. Ofcourse, information
about the exchange’s existence must be disseminated to both sides.
3 Collective Rights Organizations
Collective rights organizations (CROs) typically provide a bundle of goods and prices
are often set as a bundle. We focus on royalty collection organizations (RCOs) and
patent pools.1 The access pattern of users differ between RCOs and patent pools. Each
licensee (user) of RCOs accesses a different combination of goods from the bundle.
For instance, in case of American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (AS-
CAP), each radio station has a different play list made up of music available through
ASCAP. On the other hand, every user of a patent pool basically uses the same com-
bination of patents. In case a patent pool is for implementing a standard, a particulary
combination of patents is necessary to implement the standard. Licensees of MPEG
LA basically use same bundle of patents.
1One can consider open-source collective as special case of a patent pool or RCO where price is not
payment to the organization prior to use but forgoing future earnings.
5When a bundle of goods must be used together, there is economic beneﬁt other
than reduction of transaction costs, i.e., elimination of double-marginalization. For this
reason patent pools offer a completely different advantage from RCOs. Although there
is no beneﬁt from elimination of double=marginilization, the fact that licensees choose
subset of IPRs means the marginal constraint does not bind (Lerner and Tirole, 2004)
and a pool is welfare enhancing. At the same time, there is no immediate economic
justiﬁcation for RCOs pricing the whole bundle as in case of “blanket licensing” of
ASCAP.
3.1 Patent Pools
Notable patent pools were already established in the 19th century such as the sewing
machine pool from 1856. Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA) was formed
in 1914. The patent pools was encouraged by the U.S. Secretary of the Navy. The
pool was based on two major patents held by Glenn Curtis and the Wright brothers.
Curtis’s patent infringed on the Wright brothers patent but the brothers had refused to
license their patent to Curtis. There were also many subsidiary patents held by smaller
ﬁrms. The pool allowed members to use the pooled patents royalty free while non-
members payed royalty. The pool among members were effectively a cross-licensing
arrangement. Only Curtis and the Wright brothers collected royalty. Other members
only received rights to produce without a license and not to be litigated.
Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was formed in 1920 to implement the radio
patent pool. The pool was formed to resolve blocking patents owned by Marconi Wire-
less and Telegraph Company, AT&T, General Electric, Westinghouse and others with
the encouragement of U.S. Navy. Marconi Wireless owned the diode vacuum patent
while AT&T was the assignee of deForest’s triode vacuum tube patent.
BoththeMAAandRCAwereencouragedbygovernmentandhadprincipalpatents.
The main intention was to reduce the transaction cost of “patent thicket”. We also note
6that owners of the principal patents took the lead in organization and membership was
small.
Recently patent pools to implement technological standards have become promi-
nent. With technologies that require very large investments to develop, ﬁrms are keen
to establish a standard at a very early stage to avoid waste. Firms often start interaction
to established a standard and shift to discussion of licensing once a standard is agreed.
The Motion Pictures Experts Group Licensing Administration (MPEG LA) and
Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) are such examples (Table 1 at end of paper). The MPEG
LA administers several generations of MPEG standards but it originally started with
MPEG2. The MPEG2 standard was established in 1994 soon after the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) participation in 1992. Prior to this since middle of
1993, nine ﬁrms that owned the 27 essential patents for the technology had formed the
MPEG Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (MPEG IPR WG) to ﬁnd a way
to cover all essential patent in a single license. In May 1996 the nine ﬁrms and one
university contributed capital to establish the MPEG LA. It actually started licensing
33 essentail licenses in July 1997, one month after the US Justice Department issued its
Review Letter clearing the pool of anti-trust concerns. Currently MPEG LA licenses
over 640 patents owned by 13 ﬁrms and one university.
The DVD standard was established by the DVD Consortium made up of 10 patent
owners (ﬁrms) in 1995 as a compromise of two systems, SD and MMCD. It was soon
agreed that a patent pool should be formed to maintain the cost of licensing low in
order to promote the new standard. 1996, Thompson left the consortium and started to
license independently. The nine ﬁrms continued efforts to license but Phillips, SONY
and Pioneer expressed dissatisfaction with how the revenue of the pool would be dis-
tributed. In 1997 the 3 ﬁrms left to license their patents together but separate from the
Consortium. The two groups started licensing separately the following year. As result,
it is necessary to have three separate licenses in order to implement the DVD technol-
7ogy. The DVD logo is administered by another entity, DVD Format Logo Licensing.
Simple Model
There are three ﬁrms, A,B and C, that each have a patent to implement a standard. The
total number of licenses demanded when total royalty is r is,
Q = 1 − r.
If there is only licensor that charges r0, then r = r0. If there are two licensors charging
r1 and r2 each, then it is r = r1 + r2.
There are three possible licensor conﬁgurations:
• Patent pool – all 3 ﬁrms form a single pool, there is only one licensor
• Independent Licensing – all 3 ﬁrms license independently, 3 licensors
• Firm C is an outsider – ﬁrms A and B form a pool but ﬁrm C is independent, 2
licensors.
Each licensor sets its royalty ri to maximize own revenue,
Qri = (1 − r) × ri.
If there is only one licensor, r = ri, otherwise r > ri. Revenue maximizing royalty
and revenue according to number of licensors is shown in Table 2.
Regime Patent Pool Firm C outside Independent Licensing
No. of licensors 1 2 3
Licensor royalty 30 20 15
Total royalty 30 40 45
Total licenses demanded 60 20 15
Licensor revenue 900 400 225
8Table 2 : Royalties and revenues with different number of licensors
Note that total royalty increases with number of licensors. This is due to double
marginalization. When choosing royalty rate separately, each licensor does not take
into account the decline in proﬁt of ﬁrms when there is a reduction in license demand
from raising own royalty. When they choose a royalty rate together as a pool, loss of
proﬁt for all members from raising royalty is taken into account. This phenomenon
occurs because the patents must be used together (complements) and is the principle
behind Department of Justice’s view of patent pools. Patent pool of all ﬁrms reduce
number of licensors to one, achieving lowest possible total royalty, 30 in the example.
Note that because of low total royalty, ﬁrms are better off organizing into a single
pool. Pool revenue is 900 which is greater than the total of all three licensees were they
to license independently which will be 675 in the example.
Another important observation is that each licensee gets revenue of 400 if only
some of the ﬁrms (in this case only two ﬁrms) form a pool. Firm C gets 400, which
is more than one third of 900, what it would get if it joined the pool and revenue were
divided equally. This explains why some ﬁrms leave the pool or refuse to join when
others have formed into one licensing organization. Firm C refusing to join is very
unfortunate for the other 2 ﬁrms which only get 200 each.
In this case, ﬁrms A and B should guarantee a bit more than 400, say 410, to induce
ﬁrm C to join the pool. Even after giving ﬁrm C’s 410, ﬁrm A and B can split 900 -
410 = 490 , which is more than 200 !
Patent pools are not stable. However in many cases, by adjusting the payment it is
possible to induce ﬁrms to join. Heterogeneity of ﬁrms will contribute to instability.
Firms that depend on research such as Rambus has a very different incentive from that
of Toshiba whose proﬁt is primarily from manufacturing (Aoki and Nagaoka, 2004).
9Formation and Stability
Both patent pools and other standard implementation patent pools consist of comple-
mentary patents, that is, patents that must be used together. For such a bundle of patents
price of a bundle will be cheaper than the total price if patents were priced indepen-
dently. This is something that patent owners are keen to take advantage of which makes
forming a pool of complementary patents attractive. In addition when the patents are
for implementing a new standard, reduction of total royalty rate will help promote
adoption of the new standard.
However many pools suffer from instability, that is, some members leave. This
occurs because reduction of bundle of patents by pricing together means an indepen-
dent patent licensee can charge more. Unless appropriate compensation is given to the
patentee by the pool to make it attractive enough to stay in the pool, a member may
leave and license independently. This in fact is the case in case of Rambus and the
DVD standard.
Distribution of patent pool revenue (licensing fees) must be done to prevent mem-
bers from leaving and licensing independently. This means distribution according to
number of patent ownership may be inappropriate.
The incentive to leave and free rider on the patent pool can also impede formation
of a pool.
3.2 Royalty Collection Organizations
The most well known and successful of these is are two performance rights organi-
zations, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and
its competitor Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI). There are examples of other RCOs that
administer music performances: BELGRAMEX(Belgium),GVL (Germany), Associa-
tione Nazionale dei Fonograﬁca Italiani (Italy) and Phonographic Performance Limited
(UK). There are also many copyright collectives that collect royalties from photocopy
10of books and articles, such as Copyright Clearance Center (USA) and Copyright Li-
censing Agency (UK).
ASCAP started in 1914 as a way of nine prominent composers from New York pool
their resources to litigate copyright infringement. The litigated and sought injunction
diligently and were often successful. ASCAP initially let radios play music freely until
around 1925 when it started to litigate. By 1940 it had established the right to collect
royalty for all music played on the radio. Membership was 1000 in 1941 and had
grown to over 31,000 composers and 24,000 publishers by late 1990s. The rival RCO
Broadcasting Music Incorporated (BMI) was established in 1940 by radio stations in an
attempttocounter ASCAP. Bylate1990sBMIrepresents about 150,000UScomposers
and 50,00 US publishers. It operates in a similar way to ASCAP.
ASCAP issues “blanket licenses” to licensees that charges a ﬁxed fee, independent
of which music is played, usually a proportion of licensee’s revenue. The ﬁxed fee is
set to reﬂect the value of music of the industry. The license gives the licensee right to
play any of the music in the ASCAP catalogue. ASCAP distributes license revenue to
members according to how much the member’s music was played or performed. The
number of performance is obtained by combination of reporting by major licensees
such as major television and monitoring of other licensees.
Simple Model
The following model is due to Bensen, Kirby and Salop. When the size of intellectual
property rights (IPR) are N, the value to society of the catalogue is V (N). We assume
V (N) is increasing concave function of N. Each licensee would be paying their in-
dividual value of the catalogue and the sum of all the fees should be equal to V (N).
Thus this is RCO’s licensing revenue. The RCO’s adminstration cost is
C(N) = F + cN,
11where F is the ﬁxed cost of adminstration and c is the cost per property. In case of
ASCAP, c would be the monitoring cost. The surplus is π(N) = V (N) − cN − F.
For simplicity we assume one member has one IPR and RCO surplus is divided
equally among its N members . Then in order to maximize per member proﬁt, mem-




V (N) − cN − F
N
.




Nm = 0 ⇔ V 0(Nm) − c =
V (Nm) − cNm − F
Nm . (1)
The membership size Nm to maximize per member surplu is set so that marginal sur-
plus equals surplus per member.
The socially optimal membership size is to maximize total surplus, π(N) and the
optimal membership N∗ satisﬁes ,
π0(N) = 0 ⇔ V 0(N∗) = c. (2)
The socially optimal membership size, N∗ is set to equate marginal surplus to marginal
cost. Comparing equation (1) and (2), we observe that membership is kept too small if
RCO tries to maximize surplus per member, Nm < N∗.
Formation and Stability
Advantage of RCOs is the reduction of transaction cost for enforcing property rights.
This was the original intent when nine composers got together to litigate. The basic
principle is true today. ASCAP saves monitoring cost by monitoring all music perfor-
mances, making individual monitoring by composers unnecessary. ASCAP and BMI
12have not suffered from instability like patent pools. First of all, there is no externality
that non-members can free ride on. In fact, the “blanket license” practiced by RCOs
such as ASCAP contributes to stability. Because licensees pay a ﬁxed fee, there is no
marginal cost of playing music from the RCO catalogue. On the other hand, licensee
must pay a separate royalty to play music of a non-member. It would be very difﬁcult
to get ones music played if the composer is a non-member. Not only is there incentive
to stay, there is an incentive to join RCO. It is not surprising that ASCAP has been
stable and membership has grown.
4 Concluding Remarks
Wehavereviewed2groupsofinstitutionstofacilitateaccesstogenepatents, exchanges
and collective rights organizations (CRO). The beneﬁt from exchanges, both informa-
tion and technology exchanges, is reduction of transaction costs, particularly search
costs. This results in a network effect, where value of becoming a member depends on
number of other members. This is also the key to successful formation of an exchange:
it must guarantee a critical mass of members to attract any members. The network
effect also makes the exchanges very stable. There is no incentive to leave a exchange
and forgo the beneﬁt of network effect.
Representative examples of CROs are patent pools and royalty collection organiza-
tions (RCO)s. Patent pool’s beneﬁt comes from bundling and beneﬁcial when a bundle
of patents must be used together (complements). RCOs facilitate one-stop shopping, in
the sense of ﬁnd a bundle of patents and having to acquire just one license. They also
provide a bundle of IPRs but unlike patent pools, each user will use different subsets
of the bundle. Despite this they are often priced as a bundle called “blanket licenses”.
Blanket licenses effectively increases the price of IPRs not included in the RCO cat-
alogue. This makes joining the RCO very attractive to IPR owners. RCOs imposes a
negative externality to non-members which makes it very stable. This is opposite of
13patent pools which suffer from instability due to the positive externality it generates for
non-members. This makes patent pools very unstable, prone to break ups or members
deserting.
Open-source collectives can be grouped with CROs as a patent pool or RCO that
requires licensee to forgo future proﬁts as “royalty payment”. The future proﬁt would
be independent of how many of the licenses were used having the same effect as a
blanket license. However, the size of royalty payment, i.e., forgone proﬁt would be
signiﬁcant for large for proﬁt ﬁrms while negligible for academic institutions. Joining
an open-source collective is more attractive for institutions with low proﬁt. In case
of software, its developers are often individuals that may not be devoting full time to
open-source development.
14Table 1: Recent Standard Patent Pools







any ﬁrm that has an
essential patent can
participate; currenlty
22 ﬁrms, 1 univ.
1. The contract term is from 10 and a half to 15 and a half years.
2. For MPEG-2 decoding products, the royalty is US $4.00 for each
decode unit. A royalty of US $6 per unit applies to Consumer Products
having both encoding and decoding capabilities. (Both of which prior
to Jan. 1, 2002, and $2.50 from Jan. 1, 2002.) Etc.
3. Licensees have the right to renew for successive ﬁve-year periods for
the life of any MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio Patent, subject to reasonable
amendment of royalty terms and rates (not to increase by more than
25%).




1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties de-
pends on the share of patents con-
tributed to the pool.
DVD(3C),
1998
Philips Philips, Sony, Pio-
neer
1. The contract term is 10 years.
2. Commitment to royalty (royalties of 3.5% of the net selling price for
each player sold, subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which drops
to $5 as of Jan. 1, 2000 and $.05 per disc sold.)
3. A most favorable conditions clause.
4. An obligation for licensee to grant-back any essential patent on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
115 patents for the man-
ufacture of DVD players,
95 patents for the manu-
facture of the discs.
Future essential patents
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties is not
a function of the number of patents








1. The contracts run until Dec. 31, 2007 and renew automatically for
5-years terms thereafter.
2. Commitment to royalty (royalties of $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of
the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum
royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder)
3. A most-favored-nations clause
4. An obligation for licensee to grantback any essential patent on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
Allthepresentandfuture
essential patents
1. Each ﬁrms can license indepen-
dently.
2. The allocation of royalties de-
pends on the share of patents con-







19 ﬁrms (8 operators,
11 manufacturers)
1. Maximum Cumulative Royalty is 5%.
2. Standard Royalty Rate per certiﬁed essential patent is 0.1% (How-
ever, the option to negotiate a bi-lateral agreement is available)
All the essential patents
of the member ﬁrms
1. Members able to by-pass and li-
cense independently with mutually
agreeable terms.
2. The allocation of royalties de-
pends on the share of patents con-
tributed to the pool.
Source: Nagata(2002); http://www.3gpatents.com; http://www.mpegla.com; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Carey R. Ramos, June
10, 1999; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney, December 16, 1998.
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